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Is Word Sense Disambiguation just one more
NLP task?
Yorick Wilks
Abstract
The paper compares the tasks of part-of-speech (POS) tagging and
word-sense-tagging or disambiguation (WSD), and argues that the tasks
are not related by fineness of grain or anything like that, but are quite
different kinds of task, particularly because there is nothing in POS cor-
responding to sense novelty. The paper also argues for the reintegration
of sub-tasks that are being separated for evaluation.
1 Introduction
I want to make clear right away that I am not writing as a sceptic about word-
sense disambiguation (WSD) let alone as a recent convert: on the contrary,
since my PhD thesis was on the topic thirty years ago. That (Wilks, 1968)
was what we would now call a classic AI toy system approach, one that used
techniques later called Preference Semantics, but applied to real newspaper
texts, as controls on the philosophical texts that were my real interest at the
time. But it did attach single sense representations to words drawn from a
polysemous lexicon of 800 or so. If Boguraev was right, in his informal survey
twelve years ago, that the average NLP lexicon was under fifty words, then that
work was ahead of its time and I do therefore have a longer commitment to,
and perspective on, the topic than most, for whatever that may be worth!.
I want to raise some general questions about WSD as a task, aside from
all the busy work in SENSEVAL: questions that should make us worried and
wary about what we are doing here, but definitely NOT stop doing it. I can
start by reminding us all of the obvious ways in which WSD is not like part-
of-speech (POS) tagging, even though the two tasks are plainly connected in
information terms, as Stevenson and I pointed out in (Wilks and Stevenson,
1998a), and were widely misunderstood for doing so. From these differences, of
POS and WSD, I will conclude that WSD is not just one more partial task to be
hacked off the body of NLP and solved. What follows acknowledges that Resnik
and Yarowsky made a similar comparison in 1997 (Resnik and Yarowsky, 1997)
though this list is a little different from theirs:
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1. There is broad agreement about POS tags in that, even for those commit-
ted to differing sets, there is little or no dispute that they can be put into
one-many correspondence. That is not generally accepted for the sets of
senses for the same words from different lexicons.
2. There is little dispute that humans can POS tag to a high degree of consis-
tency, but again this is not universally agreed for WS tagging, as various
email discussions leading up to this workshop have shown. I’ll come back
to this issue below, but its importance cannot be exaggerated— if humans
cannot do it then we are wasting our time trying to automate it. I assume
that fact is clear to everyone: whatever maybe the case in robotics or fast
arithmetic, in the NL parts of AI there is no point modelling or training
for skills that humans do not have!
3. I do not know the genesis of the phrase “lexical tuning,” but the phe-
nomenon has been remarked, and worked on, for thirty years and everyone
seems agreed that it happens, in the sense that human generators create,
and human analysers understand, words in quite new senses, ungenerated
before or, at least, not contained in the point-of-reference lexicon, whether
that be thought of as in the head or in the computer. Only this view is
consistent with the evident expansion of sense lists in dictionaries with
time; these new additions cannot plausibly be taken as established usages
not noticed before.
If this is the case, it seems to mark an absolute difference from POS tagging
(where novelty does not occur in the same way), and that should radically alter
our view of what we are doing here, because we cannot apply the standard
empirical modelling method to that kind of novelty.
The now standard empirical paradigm of [mark-up, model/train, and test]
assumes prior markup, in the sense of a positive answer to the question (2)
above. But we cannot, by definition, mark up for new senses, those not in the
list we were initially given, because the text analysed creates them, or they were
left out of the source from which the mark up list came. If this phenomenon is
real, and I assume it is, it sets a limit on phenomenon (2), the human ability
to pre-tag with senses, and therefore sets an upper bound on the percentage
results we can expect from WSD, a fact that marks WSD out quite clearly from
POS tagging.
The contrast here is in fact quite subtle as can be seen from the interesting
intermediate case of semantic tagging: which is the task of attaching semantic,
rather than POS, tags to words automatically, a task which can then be used
to do more of the WSD task (as in Dini et al., 1998) than POS tagging can,
since the ANIMAL or BIRD versus MACHINE tags can then separate the main
senses of “crane”. In this case, as with POS, one need not assume novelty in
the tag set, but must allow for novel assignments from it to corpus words e.g.
when a word like “dog” or “pig” was first used in a human sense. It is just this
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sense of novelty that POS tagging does also have, of course, since a POS tag like
VERB can be applied to what was once only a noun, as with “ticket”. This kind
of novelty, in POS and semantic tagging, can be pre-marked up with a fixed tag
inventory, hence both these techniques differ from genuine sense novelty which
cannot be premarked.
As I said earlier, the thrust of these remarks is not intended sceptically,
either about WSD in particular, or about the empirical linguistic agenda of the
last ten years more generally. I assume the latter has done a great deal of good
to NLP/CL: it has freed us from toy systems and fatuous example mongering,
and shown that more could be done with superficial knowledge-free methods
than the whole AI knowledge-based-NLP tradition ever conceded: the tradition
in which every example, every sentence, had in principle to be subjected to the
deepest methods. Minsky and McCarthy always argued for that, but it seemed
to some even then an implausible route for any least-effort-driven theory of
evolution to have taken. The caveman would have stood paralysed in the path
of the dinosaur as he downloaded deeper analysis modules, trying to disprove
he was only having a nightmare.
However, with that said, it may be time for some corrective: time to ask
not only how we can continue to slice off more fragments of partial NLP as
tasks to model and evaluate, but also how to reintegrate them for real tasks
that humans undoubtedly can evaluate reliably, like MT and IE, and which are
therefore unlike some of the partial tasks we have grown used to (like syntactic
parsing) but on which normal language users have no views at all, for they are
expert-created tasks, of dubious significance outside a wider framework. It is
easy to forget this because it is easier to keep busy, always moving on. But there
are few places left to go after WSD:–empirical pragmatics has surely started but
may turn out to be the final leg of the journey.
Given the successes of empirical NLP at such a wide range of tasks, it is not
to soon to ask what it is all for, and to remember that, just because machine
translation (MT) researchers complained long ago that WSD was one of their
main problems, it does not follow that high level percentage success at WSD
will advance MT. It may do so, and it is worth a try, but we should remem-
ber that Martin Kay warned years ago that no set of individual solutions to
computational semantics, syntax, morphology etc. would necessarily advance
MT. However, unless we put more thought into reintegrating the new techniques
developed in the last decade we shall never find out.
2 Can humans sense tag?
I wish now to return to two of the topics raised above: first, the human task:
itself.
It seems obvious to me that, aside from the problems of tuning and other
phenomena that go under names like vagueness, humans, after training, can
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sense-tag texts at reasonably high levels and reasonable inter-annotator consis-
tency. They can do this with alternative sets of senses for words for the same
text, although it may be a task where some degree of training and prior literacy
are essential, since some senses in such a list are usually not widely known to
the public. This should not be shocking: teams of lexicographers in major pub-
lishing houses constitute literate, trained teams and they can normally achieve
agreement sufficient for a large printed dictionary for publication (about sense
sets, that is, a closely related skill to sense-tagging). Those averse to claims
about training and expertise here should remember that most native speak-
ers cannot POS tag either, though there seems substantial and uncontentious
consistency among the trained.
There is strong evidence for this position on tagging ability, which includes
(Green, 1989 see also Jorgensen, 1990) and indeed the high figures obtained
for small word sets by the techniques pioneered by Yarowsky (Yarowsky, 1995).
Many of those figures rest on forms of annotation (e.g. assignment of words to
thesaurus head sets in Roget), and the general plausibility of the methodology
serves to confirm the reality of human annotation (as a consistent task) as a
side effect.
The counterarguments to this have come explicitly from the writings of Kil-
garriff (1993), and sometimes implicitly from the work of those who argue from
the primacy of lexical rules or of notions like vagueness in regard to WSD.
In Kilgarriff’s case I have argued elsewhere (Wilks, 1997) that the figures he
produced on human annotation are actually consistent with very high levels of
human ability to sense-tag and are not counter-arguments at all, even though
he seems to remain sceptical about the task in his papers. He showed only that
for most words there are some contexts for which humans cannot assign a sense,
which is of course not an argument against the human skill being generally
successful.
On a personal note, I would hope very much to be clearer when I see his
published reaction to the SENSEVAL workshop what his attitude to WSD really
is. In writing he is a widely published sceptic, in the flesh he is the prime
organiser of this excellent event (SENSEVAL Workshop) to test a skill he may,
or may not, believe in. There need be no contradiction there, but a fascinating
question about motive lingers in the air. Has he set all this up so that WSD can
destroy itself when rigourously tested? One does not have to be a student of
double-blind tests, and the role of intention in experimental design, to take these
questions seriously, particularly as he has designed the SENSEVALmethodology
and the use of the data himself. The motive question here is not mere ad
hominem argument but a serious question needing an answer.
These are not idle questions, in my view, but go to the heart of what the
SENSEVAL workshop is for: is it to show how to do better at WSD, or is to say
something about wordsense itself (which might involve saying that you cannot
do WSD by computer at all, or cannot do it well enough to be of interest?).
In all this discussion we should remember that, if we take the improvement
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of (assessable) real tasks as paramount, those like MT, Information Retrieval
and Information Extraction (IE), then it may not in the end matter whether
humans are ever shown psycholinguistically to need POS tagging or WSD for
their own language performance;–there is much evidence they do not. But that
issue is wholly separate from what concerns us here; it may still be useful to
advance MT/IE via partial tasks like WSD, if they can be shown performable,
assessable, and modelable by computers, no matter how humans turn out to
work.
The implicit critique of the broadly positive position above (i.e. that WSD
can be done by people and machines and we should keep at it) sometimes seems
to come as well from those who argue (a) for the inadequacy of lexical sense
sets over productive lexical rules and (b) for the inherently vague quality of
the difference between senses of a given word. I believe both these approaches
are muddled if their proponents conclude that WSD is therefore fatally flawed
as a task;- and clearly not all do since some of them are represented here as
participants.
3 Lexical Rules
Lexical rules go back at least to Givon’s (1967) thirty-year old sense-extension
rules and they are in no way incompatible with a sense-set approach, like that
found in a classic dictionary. Such sense sets are normally structured (often by
part of speech and by general and specific senses) and the rules are, in some
sense, no more than a compression device for predicting that structuring. But
the set produced by any set of lexical rules is still a set, just as a dictionary list
of senses is a set, albeit structured. It is mere confusion to think one is a set and
one not: Nirenburg and Raskin (1997) have pointed out that those who argue
against lists of senses (in favour of rules, e.g. Pustejovsky 1995) still produce
and use such lists. What else could they do?
I myself cannot get sufficient clarity at all on what the lexical rule approach,
whatever its faults or virtues, has to do with WSD? The email discussion preced-
ing this workshop showed there were people who think the issues are connected,
but I cannot see it, but would like to be better informed before I go home from
here. If their case is that rules can predict or generate new senses then their po-
sition is no different (with regard to WSD) from that of anyone else who thinks
new senses important, however modelled or described. The rule/compression
issue itself has nothing essential to do with WSD: it is simply one variant of the
novelty/tuning/new-sense/metonymy problem, however that is described.
The vagueness issue is again an old observation, one that, if taken seriously,
must surely result in a statistical or fuzzy-logic approach to sense discrimina-
tion, since only probabilistic (or at least quantitative) methods can capture
real vagueness. That, surely, is the point of the Sorites paradox: there can be
no plausible or rational qualitatively-based criterion (which would include any
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quantitative system with clear limits: e.g. tall = over 6 feet) for demarcating
“tall”, “green” or any inherently vague concept.
If, however, sense sets/lists/inventories are to continue to play a role, vague-
ness can mean no more than highlighting what all systems of WSD must have,
namely some parameter or threshold for the assignment to one of a list of senses
versus another, or setting up a new sense in the list. Talk of vagueness adds
nothing specific to help that process for those who want to assign on some quan-
titative basis to one sense rather than another; algorithms will capture the usual
issue of tuning to see what works and fits our intuitions.
Vagueness would be a serious concept only if the whole sense list for a word
(in rule form or not) was abandoned in favour of statistically-based unsuper-
vised clusters of usages or contexts. There have been just such approaches to
WSD in recent years (e.g. Bruce and Wiebe, 1994, Pedersen and Bruce, 1997,
Schuetze & Pederson, 1995) and the essence of the idea goes back to Sparck
Jones 1964/1986) but such an approach would find it impossible to take part in
any competition like SENSEVAL because it would inevitably deal in nameless
entities which cannot be marked up for.
Vague and Lexical Rule based approaches also have the consequence that
all lexicographic practice is, in some sense, misguided: dictionaries according to
such theories are fraudulent documents that could not help users, whom they
systematically mislead by listing senses. Fortunately, the market decides this
issue, and it is a false claim. Vagueness in WSD is either false (the last position)
or trivial, and known and utilised within all methodologies.
This issue owes something to the systematic ignorance of its own history
so often noted in AI. A discussion email preceding this workshop referred to
the purported benefits of underspecification in lexical entries, and how recent
formalisms had made that possible. How could anyone write such a thing in
ignorance of the 1970s and 80s work on incremental semantic interpretation of
Hirst, Mellish and Small (Hirst, 1987; Mellish, 1983; Small et al., 1988) among
others?
None of this is a surprise to those with AI memories more than a few weeks
long: in our field people read little outside their own notational clique, and
constantly “rediscover” old work with a new notation. This leads me to my
final point which has to do, as I noted above, with the need for a fresh look
at technique integration for real tasks. We all pay lip service to this while
we spend years on fragmentary activity, arguing that that is the method of
science. Well, yes and no, and anyway WSD is not science: what we are doing
is engineering and the scientific method does not generally work there, since
engineering is essentially integrative, not analytical. We often write or read of
“hybrid” systems in NLP, which is certainly an integrative notion, but we have
little clear idea of what it means. If statistical or knowledge-free methods are
to solve some or most cases of any linguistic phenomenon, like WSD, how do
we then locate that subclass of the phenomena that other, deeper, techniques
like AI and knowledge-based reasoning are then to deal with? Conversely, how
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can we know which cases the deeper techniques cannot or need not deal with?
If there is an upper bound to empirical methods, and I have argued that that
will be lower for WSD than for some other NLP tasks for the reasons set out
above, then how can we pull in other techniques smoothly and seamlessly for
the “hard” examples?
The experience of POS tagging, to return to where we started, suggests that
rule-driven taggers can do as well as purely machine learning-based taggers,
which, if true, suggests that symbolic methods, in a broad sense, might still be
the right approach for the whole task. Are we yet sure this is not the case for
WSD? I simply raise the question. Ten years ago, it was taken for granted in
most of the AI/NLP community that knowledge-based methods were essential
for serious NLP. Some of the successes of the empirical program (and especially
the TIPSTER program) have caused many to reevaluate that assumption. But
where are we now, if a real ceiling to such methods is already in sight? Informa-
tion Retrieval languished for years, and maybe still does, as a technique with a
practical use but an obvious ceiling, and no way of breaking through it; there
was really nowhere for its researchers to go. But that is not quite true for us,
because the claims of AI/NLP to offer high quality at NLP tasks have never
been really tested. They have certainly not failed, just got left behind in the
rush towards what could be easily tested!
4 Large or Small-scale WSD?
Which brings me to my final point: general versus small-scale WSD. Our group
is one of the few that has insisted on continuing with general WSD: the tagging
and test of all content words in a text, a group that includes CUP, XERC-
Grenoble and CRL-NMSU. We currently claim about 90% correct sense assign-
ment (Wilks and Stevenson, 1998b) and do not expect to be able to improve
much on that for the reasons set out above; we believe the rest is AI or lexical
tuning! The general argument for continuing with the all-word paradigm, rather
than the highly successful paradigm of Yarowsky et al., is that that is the real
task, and there is no firm evidence that the small scale will scale up to the large
because much of sense-disambiguation is mutual between the words of the text,
which cannot be used by the small set approach. I am not sure this argument
is watertight but it seems plausible to me.
Logically, if you claim to do all the content words you ought, in principle,
to be able to enter a contest like SENSEVAL that does only some of the words
with an unmodified system. This is true, but you will also expect to do worse, as
you have not have had as much training data for the chosen word set. Moreover
you will have to do far more preparation to enter if you insist, as we would, on
bringing the engines and data into play for all the training and test set words; the
effort is that much greater and it makes such an entry self-penalising in terms of
both effort and likely outcome, which is why we decided not to enter in the first
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round, regretfully, but just to mope and wail at the sidelines. The methodology
chosen for SENSEVAL was a natural reaction to the lack of training and test
data for the WSD task, as we all know, and that is where I would personally
like to see effort put in the future, so that everyone can enter all the words; I
assume that would be universally agreed to if the data were there. It is a pity,
surely, to base the whole structure of a competition on the paucity of the data.
5 Conclusion
What we would like to suggest positively is that we cooperate to produce more
data, and use existing all-word systems, like Grenoble, CUP, our own and others
willing to join, possibly in combination, so as to create large-scale tagged data
quasi-automatically, rather in the way that the Penn tree bank was produced
with the aid of parsers, not just people.
We have some concrete suggestions as to how this can be done, and done
consistently, using not only multiple WSD systems but also by cross comparing
the lexical resources available, e.g. WordNet (or EuroWordNet) and a major
monolingual dictionary. We developed our own reasonably large test/training
set with the WordNet-LDOCE sense translation table (SENSUS, Knight and
Luk, 1994) from ISI. Some sort of organised effort along those lines, before the
next SENSEVAL, would enable us all to play on a field not only level, but much
larger.
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